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THOSE SCAMMING LITTLE RASCALS: POWER WHEELCHAIR 
FRAUD AND THE FLAW IN THE MEDICARE SYSTEM 
 
Sydney Mayer 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
In the last two decades, power wheelchair fraud has grown into a 
billion dollar industry. While power wheelchairs have been the most popu- 
lar choice in recent years, the method of fraud has been around since 
Medicare’s inception. The pay and chase model, in which Medicare re- 
ceives a claim and pays the claimant before reviewing the actual claim for 
any fraud, enables a cycle of fraud that moves from one item to another 
and leads to the loss of billions of dollars. By the time the government 
catches on to one popular fraudulent item, the fraud has moved to the next 
one. While the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act does address 
the issue of power wheelchair fraud and effectively removes its profitabil- 
ity through its reforms, like other anti-fraud and abuse legislation, it does 
not address the underlying, consistent problem with the entire system. In- 
stead of continuously applying singular solutions to the greater problem, 
the government should write legislation that overhauls the Medicare sys- 
tem’s payment methods. In addition, if a standardized computer system 
were implemented in a similar way to what is being done nationally in law 
enforcement, perhaps the cycle could be broken. Until then, the fraud will 
continue as it has been for decades, and Medicare will endure massive fi- 
nancial losses. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In March 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Patient Protec- 
tion and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA”) into law.1 While its main goals 
are to lower healthcare costs, expand access of coverage to millions, and 
 
 
1 Affordable Care Act, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
http://www.medicaid.gov/affordablecareact/affordable-care-act.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2014). 
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enhance the quality of healthcare, PPACA also sought to address the nu- 
merous fraud and abuse issues that the American healthcare system had 
endured in the past three decades.2 The Medicare system loses billions, 
even trillions, of dollars annually to fraudulent claims and abuse of the 
system’s flaws; the financial losses exceeded $3 trillion in 2014 according 
to the FBI.3 In recent years, the most popular and profitable fraudulent 
schemes have centered on power wheelchairs and their Medicare reim- 
bursements. Since the federal government discovered it was a    remunera- 
tive form of fraud in the mid-1990s, power wheelchair scams have become 
a billion dollar industry, running rampant for over a decade throughout the 
country.4 Although PPACA directly addresses the power wheelchair fraud 
problem, enacting changes to the Medicare system to alleviate the heavy 
financial losses, it does not address the true problem that power wheelchair 
fraud demonstrates. Since its creation in 1966, Medicare has been subject 
to serious and consistent fraud, made possible through the pay and chase 
payment model, in which the states pay providers for submitted claims and 
then attempt to recover payments from liable third parties.5 With a pay- 
ment model that facilitates schemers fraudulent reimbursements from 
Medicaid by merely mailing in a claim, simply addressing the symptoms 
and ignoring the overarching illness, as the government has been doing, 
does not solve the true flaw in the system. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. In Part I, I discuss the pay and 
chase Medicare model and how it enabled power wheelchair fraud to be- 
come a reality. In Part II, I examine the changes made by PPACA and its 
implications on power wheelchair fraud. Finally, in Part III, I illustrate that 
the real problem with the Medicare system is that the pay-and-chase reim- 
bursement model enables fraud and abuse and propose two potential solu- 
tions: enacting new legislation and creating a standardized computer sys- 
tem to process claims and identify questionable submissions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Program Integrity, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
http://www.medicaid.gov/affordablecareact/provisions/program-integrity.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2014). 
3 Health Care Fraud, Federal Bureau of Investigation, http://www.fbi.gov/about- 
us/investigate/white_collar/health-care-fraud (last visited Dec. 12, 2014). 
4 David A. Fahrenthold, A Medicare Scam that Just Kept Rolling, WASH. POST (Aug. 16, 2014), available  
at       http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2014/08/16/a-medicare-scam-that-just-kept-rolling/. 
5  OIG, Medicaid Third-Party Liability Savings Increased, But Challenges Remain, OEI -05-11-00130 (Jan. 
2013), http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-05-11-00130.pdf, at 3. 
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I. THE PAY AND CHASE MODEL AND THE POWER 
WHEELCHAIR SCHEME 
 
By law, Medicare must pay its 4.9 million claims per day within 
thirty days of receiving the claim.6 Theoretically, during that short period 
of time, the claim reviewers should read each claim in order to identify 
and filter out the fraudulent claims.7 However, the Medicare system does 
not have the manpower to properly identify these bogus claims. A Medi- 
care Administrative Contractor (MAC) reviews only a small percentage of 
claims, likely less than three percent, before the reimbursement is provided 
to the claimant.8 The rest of the claims are reviewed after the reimburse- 
ment has been provided to the claimant.9 If the claim is identified as 
fraudulent after the money has been reimbursed to the claimant, the gov- 
ernment must pursue the fraud in the hopes that the money can be recov- 
ered. This is the “pay and chase” model. 
In essence, Medicare is an honor system, hopeful that its partici- 
pants would be honest and forward with the costs and services rendered. 
However, such an honor system made it easier for individuals to take ad- 
vantage of the system, and they have done so continuously. The system al- 
lows the claim to be made and paid, without a fact check of what a physi- 
cian is claiming to have done. In addition, the outside contractors 
employed by the government to deal with claims are poorly managed; 
authority and responsibilities are confusing, and little governmental over- 
sight is given once duties are assigned.10 
Before power wheelchairs became the most popular item of fraudu- 
lent claims, diabetic supplies and home electro-shock kits dominated the 
fraud system. Diabetes supplies were a popular choice because a patient 
did not need to go to the doctor.11 Fraudsters would place a phone call to 
the patient, claiming to be Medicare or a diabetes organization, and inform 
the patient that he or she is eligible for “free” diabetic supplies in exchange 
for their Medicare identification number or personal financial informa- 
 
 
 
6  Fahrenthold, supra note 4. 
7 Id. 
8 Id. 
9 Id. 
10 Reed Abelson and Eric Lichtblau, Pervasive Medicare Fraud Proves Hard to Stop, NY TIMES (Aug. 15, 
2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/16/business/uncovering-health-care-fraud-proves- 
elusive.html?_r=0. 
11     OIG,   Fraud   Alert   for   People   with   Diabetes,   available   at  https://oig.hhs.gov/newsroom/news- 
releases/2012/alert20120309.asp. 
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tion.12 The fraudsters would then file the claim with Medicare and be re- 
imbursed within a month. It was an intelligent scheme, one that required 
little work outside of identifying diabetic Medicare patients, but the profit 
margin was not large. The government soon identified the problem and 
addressed it with changes to how Medicare dealt with diabetic supplies. As 
a result, individuals seeking to take advantage of the pay and chase model 
had to find a new product to exploit. 
As far as Medicare fraud goes, before PPACA, power wheelchairs 
were the most popular and most profitable durable medical equipment 
(DME) for exploitation. The wheelchair itself is worth $1,000 to $4,000, 
depending on whether it is a standard or complex rehabilitation wheel- 
chair.13  A  standard  wheelchair is much  less bulky  than  its complex    coun- 
terpart and is made for basic, daily mobility.14 In contrast, a complex 
wheelchair should be more difficult to acquire because it requires that the 
“beneficiary’s mobility limitation” be extensive as a result of “a neuro- 
logical condition, muscle disease, or skeletal deformity.”15 Despite the 
heightened standard required for an individual to be prescribed a complex 
wheelchair, complex wheelchairs were reimbursed significantly more of- 
ten than standard wheelchairs. Power wheelchairs, specifically complex 
wheelchairs, yielded a very high profit margin; of its $1,000 to $4,000 
price range, Medicare reimbursed eighty percent to the physician’s office 
or the medical supply company. Its profitability coupled with the minimal 
effort it took to bill the fraudulent claim made complex power wheelchairs 
an excellent option with which to commit Medicare fraud. 
The scheme is simple. The first step is to find the patients.16  Fraud- 
sters used professional recruiters, often referred to as “cappers,” to either 
find the Medicare patient or buy Medicare numbers from a third party.17 
The capper coerced seniors to hand over their Medicare identification 
number by: 1) bribing the senior, or 2) telling the elderly patient that the 
government was giving away free wheelchairs for a limited time, and the 
patient must give the capper their number in order to participate.18 The re- 
cruiting business was lucrative, with cappers being paid up to $900 per pa- 
 
 
 
12 OIG, Fraud Alert for People with Diabetes, available at https://oig.hhs.gov/newsroom/news- 
releases/2012/alert20120309.asp. 
13  OIG, Medicare Power Wheelchair Claims Frequently Did Not Meet Documentation Requirements, OEI- 
04-07-00401 (Dec. 2009), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-07-00401.pdf. 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Fahrenthold, supra, note 4. 
17  Id. 
18  Id. 
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tient as a finder’s fee.19 Seniors have reported being pressured by cappers 
to divulge their personal Medicare information and accept the wheelchair. 
During the 2014 Los Angeles trial of Olufunke Fadojutimi, a registered 
nurse and former owner of Lutemi Medical Supply20, 71-year-old Rodolfo 
Fernandez testified that Fadojutimi pestered him until he finally accepted 
her offer of a free wheelchair.21 Fadojutimi picked up Fernandez in a van 
along with other seniors and took him for examination and fulfillment of 
her promise of a free wheelchair in exchange for his Medicare ID num- 
ber.22 Fadojutimi used this method to file $8.3 million worth of false and 
fraudulent claims, almost $4.3 million of which was paid by Medicare.23 
Next, either a doctor is bribed to certify the fraudulent prescription, 
the fraudsters buy a non-participatory doctor’s signature, or acquire a dead 
doctor’s signature for certification, which is the cheapest method of the 
three.24 In order to use the dead physician’s signature in the scheme, a 
fraudster will search through the obituaries to find a doctor who has died.25 
The individual then writes to Medicare as the dead physician, saying that 
he has changed his address and to send any further correspondents to the 
new address.26 Finally, once a physician has certified the claim, Medicare 
receives the bill, and within thirty days, the state sends back the reim- 
bursement. 
The pay and chase model enables the fraud to occur at the final  
step of the fraud scheme. Once Medicare received the claim, it was highly 
unlikely that anyone would read it fully to identify fraud. With 4.9 million 
claims received by Medicare daily and too little manpower to review each 
individually, fraudsters had little fear of getting caught. In addition, power 
wheelchair fraud was easier than other types of fraud because unlike other 
Medicare-approved equipment, it was not necessary for a physician’s of- 
fice or hospital to file the claim.27 Before PPACA, an individual could be- 
come a DME provider by complying with the Medicare program's supplier 
 
 
 
 
19  Fahrenthold, supra, note 4. 
20 Press Release, Former Owner of Southern California Medical Supply Company Found Guilty in a 10- 
Year, $8.3 Million Medicare Fraud Scheme, Federal Bureau of Investigation (Aug. 1, 2014), 
http://www.fbi.gov/losangeles/press-releases/2014/former-owner-of-southern-california-medical-supply- 
company-found-guilty-in-a-10-year-8.3-million-medicare-fraud-scheme. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
23  Fahrenthold, supra note 4. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
	   
 
 
154 DEPAUL JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW        [VOL.  17.2:149 
 
standards (42 CFR §424.57 (c)) and quality standards.28 Once approved, a 
non-medical professional could provide approved medical supplies and 
equipment and receive a Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement.29 
One of the most popular examples of this type of fraud scheme in- 
volved The Scooter Store, a Texas-based power and standard wheelchair 
company, famous for its television ads promising freedom of mobility and 
independence to seniors.30 It was also the largest power wheelchair sup- 
plier in the country.31 About eighty percent of The Scooter Store’s revenue 
came from Medicare patients.32 The company’s strategy, according to 
former salesmen, was to push and bully doctors to write prescriptions for 
power wheelchairs for needy and non-needy patients.33 In addition, its fa- 
mous television ads manipulated the elderly into thinking not only did they 
need a power wheelchair to live a normal, active life, but they were enti- 
tled to one, and any doctor who did not write them a prescription for it was 
denying them their privilege.34 This created an adversarial relationship be- 
tween the elderly patient and his or her physician, and put The Scooter 
Store in a powerful position to manipulate the elderly to seek a prescrip- 
tion until they were successful. In 2005, the United States Justice Depart- 
ment sued The Scooter Store for using false advertising to entice seniors to 
obtain power scooters that they did not want or need while Medicare ab- 
sorbed the cost.35 The Scooter Store settled the initial Justice Department 
suit for $4 million in 2007.36 From 2009 to 2012, The Scooter Store over- 
billed Medicare by over $100 million.37 However, in the ensuing years, the 
federal government audited the company, resulting in The Scooter Store 
paying the government another $19.5 million, this time for overpay- 
ments.38 In 2013, after numerous other lawsuits and filing for bankruptcy 
as a result losing its Medicare DME supplier approval, the company 
closed.39 
 
 
28 DMEPOS Accreditation, Centers of Medicare & Medicaid Services, (Aug. 24, 2012), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Provider-Enrollment-and- 
Certification/MedicareProviderSupEnroll/DMEPOSAccreditation.html. 
29  Id. 
30 The Scooter Store shutting down after federal scrutiny, CBS Probe, CBS News (Sept. 14, 2013), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-scooter-store-shutting-down-after-federal-scrutiny-cbs-probe/. 
31  Jeff Glor & Ben Eisler, Are power wheelchair companies ripping off the government?, CBS News   (Jan. 
7,     2013),    http://www.cbsnews.com/news/are-power-wheelchair-companies-ripping-off-the-government/. 
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
35 The Scooter Store shutting down after federal scrutiny, supra note 30. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
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In addition, litigation has become more prevalent in the last ten 
years as the government has begun to identify the fraud more frequently.  
In United States v. Miller, Miller owned AA Better Medical Supply in 
Houston,  Texas.40   Miller  and  her  co-conspirator,  physician  Dr. Walter 
Long, defrauded Medicare and Medicaid by submitting claims of scooters 
and wheelchairs that were either never supplied or more costly than the 
equipment actually supplied.41 Dr. Long provided pre-authorized blank 
certifications of medical necessity (CMNs); Miller and her employees 
would complete the information once they found a patient, very few of 
whom had a legitimate and pressing need for a power wheelchair.42 At 
Miller’s sentencing hearing, she stated that one reason she felt confident in 
the scheme was that she knew that CMS would “assume the truthfulness of 
information contained in her claim submissions.”43 She was correct; the 
government assumed the truthfulness of the information and paid over $1 
million to Miller during her tenure as a power wheelchair fraudster.44 
In another similar case, United States v. Metoyer, Metoyer, a 
Houston-area patient recruiter for a DME company, was convicted of one 
count of conspiring to receive illegal kickbacks for referring Medicare 
beneficiaries, and two counts of receiving illegal kickbacks for referring 
Medicare beneficiaries.45  Metoyer and her employers used the standard 
Medicare fraud scheme as described above, but in this particular case, Me- 
toyer billed the government using a special code that designated the power 
wheelchairs as replacements for wheelchairs lost during hurricanes that hit 
the area in 2008.46 She faced the maximum sentencing penalties – ten 
years in prison for health care fraud conspiracy, ten years for committing 
health care fraud, five years for conspiring to receive illegal kickbacks and 
five years for receiving an illegal kickback.47 
The power wheelchair fraud structure was successful for nearly 
two decades. After schemers realized how easy it was to exploit the sys- 
tem, the industry grew into the billions of dollars, leaving seniors with 
pointless pieces of equipment and taxpayers footing the bill. In 2010, as 
 
 
40  U.S. v. Miller, 607 F.3d 144, 147 (5th Cir. 2010). 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. at 149. 
44  Id. at 147. 
45 Houston Federal Jury Convicts Patient Recruiter of Medicare Fraud Involving Claims of Hurricane 
Damage to Power Wheelchairs, Department of Justice (May 26, 2011), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/houston-federal-jury-convicts-patient-recruiter-medicare-fraud-involving- 
claims-hurricane. 
46  Id. 
47  Id. 
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the federal government moved forward with the new healthcare system 
plan, PPACA, it recognized this issue of fraudulent claims and directly ad- 
dressed it in the legislation. While it mitigated power wheelchair claims 
issues, PPACA fails to address the overarching problem: the fact that the 
system itself allows for a cycle of abuse, always leaving Medicare a step 
behind fraudsters. 
 
II. PPACA: Changes and Implications 
 
Section 3136 of PPACA directly addresses the power wheelchair fraud is- 
sue. Three major changes to the system were made. Firstly, PPACA elimi- 
nated lump sum purchase payments for standard power wheelchairs.48 
Lump sum payments are still available for complex, rehabilitative power 
wheelchairs, but standard power wheelchairs are only available on a rent- 
to-own basis.49 Suppliers must provide these items on a monthly rental ba- 
sis like other capped rental DME not subject to a lump sum purchase op- 
tion.50 PPACA also modified rental payment amounts for power wheel- 
chairs; specifically, “payment is set at 15% (rather than 10%) of the 
purchase price for each of the first three months, and at 6% (rather than 
7.5%) of the purchase price for each of the remaining 10 months.”51 By 
doing so, PPACA reduced the profitability of the power wheelchair sys- 
tem. 
Without the availability of lump-sum payments, fraudsters were 
not making as large a profit as quickly as they had before PPACA enacted 
its changes. More importantly, the rent-to-own system allows Medicare 
time to investigate claims further.52 The hope is that the system can more 
easily detect fraud through this systemic change. Since its enactment, this 
program has proven somewhat effective. Only about 124,000 beneficiaries 
received power wheelchairs from Medicare in 2014, the lowest total since 
2001.53 
Additionally, PPACA adjusted the flawed method of orders and 
documentation. In order to receive a reimbursement, the patient notes 
submitted with the claim must acknowledge that a named physician,  phy- 
 
 
 
48 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 3136(a)(2)(A) –(B) (2010). 
49  42 U.S.C. § 3136(a)(2)(A)-(B). 
50 See generally CMS, FISS System Changes for Elimination of Lump Sum Purchase Payment for Standard 
Power Wheelchairs Furnished on or After January 1, 2011 Due to the Affordable Care Act (Jan. 28, 2011), 
https://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Guidance/Transmittals/downloads/R848OTN.pdf. 
51  42 U.S.C. § 3136(a)(1)(B). 
52  Fahrenthold, supra note 4. 
53  Id. 
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sician assistant, nurse practitioner, or clinical nurse specialist has had a 
face-to-face encounter with the patient at least six months prior to the 
submitted DME order.54 If the physician does not adhere to the documen- 
tation requirements, the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) can revoke the physician’s enrollment for up to a year or 
longer depending on the number of infractions.55 
Furthermore, a competitive DME bidding program has been im- 
plemented to limit consumers’ wheelchair choices.56 Under the competi- 
tive bidding program, suppliers submit bids to provide certain medical 
equipment and other supplies at a lower price than what Medicare cur- 
rently pays for these items.57 Medicare uses the bids to set the amount it 
will pay for equipment and supplies.58 Qualified suppliers with winning 
bids are chosen as Medicare-contract suppliers.59 The program is meant to 
limit fraud by lowering equipment prices and limiting Medicare-contracted 
suppliers within the system.60 The competitive bidding program has al- 
ready been successful since its implementation in 2011; the total spending 
on power wheelchairs, which had reached $964 million in 2003, fell to 
$190 million in  2012.61 
Although these changes have been successful in the years follow- 
ing their 2011 enactment, they only address power wheelchair fraud spe- 
cifically. The overall fraud problem is not being properly addressed by 
these continuous one-off, pointed solutions. The government needs to look 
at the system as a whole and enact change because the model is allowing 
abusers to steal millions of dollars from the already financially-strapped 
system. 
Power wheelchair fraud and the greater issue that it demonstrates 
is an important issue to be considered by the consumer and the govern- 
ment. Not only are the government and its public healthcare system being 
taken advantage of, but also the citizens are being used and abused as a re- 
sult. The elderly and the indigent are being targeted, their Medicare identi- 
fication numbers stolen, and groups of criminals are making money from 
other’s misfortunes. Every taxpayer is paying for this flaw in the system 
 
 
54  42 U.S.C. § 6407(b)(2)(ii). 
55  Id. 
56  42 U.S.C. § 3136(c)(2). 
57 Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, 
http://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/part-b/durable-medical-equipment-bidding.html (last vis- 
ited  Dec. 12, 2014). 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. 
61  Fahrenthold, supra note 4. 
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because on average, Medicare fraud costs an estimated $60 billion annu- 
ally.62 Power wheelchair fraud accounts for a large amount of those costs; 
therefore, everyone should be aware and concerned about this type of  
fraud and why it keeps occurring. To end this continuous rotation of fraud, 
the federal government needs to overhaul the Medicare system in a com- 
prehensive manner instead of dealing with each vulnerability individually 
over time. 
 
III. The Real Problem and Proposed Solutions 
 
The PPACA changes to the power wheelchair system will likely 
continue to reduce fraud and abuse in the ensuing years. However, as his- 
tory has proven, the fraud will merely switch to another Medicare-covered 
product. Legislation has continuously addressed individual forms of fraud 
instead of the principal issue, namely the ease in which fraudulent Medi- 
care reimbursement claims can be filed. For example, Medicare imple- 
mented a national mail-order program for diabetic supplies in which a 
beneficiary either had to participate in the mail-order program or use the 
pick-up option at a Medicare-approved pharmacy.63 This solution was spe- 
cific to diabetic supply fraud, but the government has failed to the  glaring 
overarching issue. 
The current remedy – to address a specific fraud after it becomes a 
serious issue for the system – does not have the long-term effects that are 
necessary to stop the cycle of fraud from occurring with other medical 
supplies. The real issue is that the pay and chase model is extremely 
flawed and has remained the Medicare reimbursement system model de- 
spite its obvious issues. It enables fraud to occur by sending people large 
amounts of money with no review of their claims; by the time fraud is de- 
tected, more often than not, the system has already lost thousands of dol- 
lars. Medicare does not have the proper resources to have strict enough 
oversight to detect fraud before the reimbursement is provided. Due to 
budget constraints, it is not a plausible option to suggest that Medicare 
needs to hire more people to handle the large amount of claims that come 
through the system. Medicare is going through a financial crisis. Although 
PPACA will reduce Medicare spending by $850 billion over the next dec- 
ade, the 2012 Medicare trustees report anticipates the Hospital    Insurance 
 
 
62  Glor & Eisler, supra note 31. 
63 Medicare’s National Mail-Order Program for Diabetic Supplies, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Serv- 
ices, http://www.medicare.gov/what-medicare-covers/part-b/dme-diabetes-national-mail-order- 
program.html. 
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Trust Fund will be depleted by 2024.64 This fiscal crisis and Medicare’s 
inability to remedy its consistent issues like understaffing demonstrates a 
serious issue with the Medicare system that the government must eradi- 
cate. 
While it may not be fiscally possible to increase the manpower to 
review claims, the federal government and the Medicare system need to 
work together to make a financially responsible decision as to how to rem- 
edy this serious fraud issue. There are several possible solutions that 
Medicare could pursue. First, the government should process claims in a 
way that identifies questionable and improper claims before they are paid. 
Because there are improper resources to deal with the claims, a standard- 
ized fraud identification software program would help Medicare have a 
more accurate level of oversight over potential fraudulent claims. Medi- 
care has continuously implemented programs to address fraud ex post 
facto. These methods include the Health Care Fraud Prevention and En- 
forcement Action Team (HEAT) and the Senior Medical Patrol (SMP). 
SMP volunteers to teach others about health care fraud and show Medicare 
and Medicaid recipients how to protect against, detect, and report fraud.65 
HEAT’s purpose is to crack down on the people and organizations that 
abuse the system and to reduce health care costs and improve quality of 
care by preventing fraudsters from taking advantage of the system.66 These 
forces against fraud have been effective in raising fraud awareness to 
Medicare beneficiaries and prosecuting fraudsters, but again, it has fo- 
cused on dealing with the issue after the fraud has already occurred. With 
this standardized fraud identification software program, it would be possi- 
ble to spot patterns within the claim that flag potential abuse. A fraud- 
spotting program could also flag physicians or medical equipment compa- 
nies with questionable histories for additional review. 
Moreover, such a program might relieve the heavy workload of 
Medicare claim reviewers. Reviewers would become more diligent in their 
claim processing and could spend more time reviewing each individual 
claim. A standardized software program could alleviate more pressures, 
reduce workloads, and spot fraud before the individual is reimbursed for 
his or her fraudulent claim. 
 
 
 
64 Joseph Antos, Medicare’s Fiscal Crisis and Options for Reform, American Enterprise Institute (May 1, 
2012),      http://www.aei.org/publication/medicares-fiscal-crisis-and-options-for-reform/. 
65 About the Senior Medical Patrol, stopmedicarefraud.gov (June 2012), 
http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/preventfraud/smp/index.html. 
66 About HEAT Task Force, stopmedicarefraud.gov (June 2012), 
http://www.stopmedicarefraud.gov/aboutfraud/heattaskforce/. 
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This Medicare fraud identification system could be modeled after 
the New York Police Department’s (“NYPD”) management software, 
CompStat. CompStat is a computer system that “synthesizes analysis of 
crime and disorder data, strategic problem solving, and a clear account- 
ability structure.”67  The NYPD uses the program to address current issues 
in the department, collect and provide data analysis of input information, 
and increase efficiency in solving crimes.68 Furthermore, CompStat “fa- 
cilitates accurate and timely analysis of crime and disorder data, which is 
used to identify crime patterns and problems.”69 The Medicare fraud iden- 
tification program must be able to identify patterns in a similar fashion, so 
CompStat would be a useful guide for how an analytical system should 
work. Through a similar pattern recognition method and by identifying red 
flag variables within those patterns, a computer program dedicated to iden- 
tifying fraud would be greatly beneficial to the fight against fraud. 
CompStat, and its Baltimore counterpart, CitiStat, individually cost 
only $20,000 to set up.70 The system costs about $350,000 to $400,000 to 
run per year; these costs are mainly the employment of analysts and an in- 
vestigator.71 This means that the bulk of the costs is employee salaries; 
once the system is set up, little extra expense is required.72 Instead of using 
expensive software and technology, CompStat and CitiStat use Microsoft 
Excel and PowerPoint to analyze the data, so it is easily teachable, as most 
individuals know how to use Excel and PowerPoint to some degree.73 
While costs are low for the smaller scale CompStat system in major U.S. 
cities, for a massive agency like CMS, the costs would be noticeably 
higher in terms of set up and running the program each year. Budgetary 
concerns may mean that if this system were implemented, the number of 
analysts and investigators would be fairly low. CMS is already under- 
staffed, and it is unlikely that the agency would want to hire a large   num- 
ber of analysts because that means a larger number of new salaries and 
benefits. But, over time, if the program proves as successful as CompStat 
has been in the ten cities that use it, CMS will likely be spurred to increase 
the number of analysts and investigators to improve the program’s effec- 
tiveness. If the program meets any of its goals – to develop strategies to 
 
 
67 Implementing and Institutionalizing CompStat in Maryland, University of Maryland, 
http://www.compstat.umd.edu/what_is_cs.php (last visited Dec. 12, 2014). 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  Tina Rosenberg, Armed With Data, Fighting More Than Crime, NY TIMES (May 2, 2012), available at 
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/02/armed-with-data-fighting-more-than-crime/?_r=0. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
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solve problems, reduce crime, and ultimately, improve the quality of 
Medicare and Medicaid’s claims system – the amount defrauded from the 
Medicare and Medicaid system will be noticeably lower. The amount of 
savings would justify increasing the number of CMS analysts and investi- 
gators. 
Additionally, Medicare should re-review all Medicare-approved 
physicians, hospitals, and suppliers to ensure that there is no history of 
fraud and abuse with the individual or organization. Along with HEAT 
and SMP, HHS should organize a special commission or task force dedi- 
cated to dealing with the reevaluation of these individuals and organiza- 
tions. Forming this commission would not be as costly as hiring more 
MACs to review claims since the task force would be temporary and 
would derive from HHS. By requiring a reevaluation process that is run by 
a dedicated task force, the government can identify individuals who have a 
questionable history. Also, a more detailed analysis of past records may 
uncover unique tactics previously unknown. This plan could address the 
issue of fraudsters using deceased physician’s Medicare identification 
numbers because each physician will be reviewed in depth. This part of the 
review process must continue after the task force is disbanded to discour- 
age fraudsters from initiating new schemes. HEAT is currently going 
through records as part of their investigation and prosecution, but institut- 
ing a task force would allow for earlier detection and would help HEAT in 
its efforts as well. 
The task force could be a pre-cursor to a Medicare CompStat sys- 
tem. In a way, the task force’s job would be to weed out the approved 
Medicare medical professionals before the system goes into place.  
Through reevaluation, the task force would spot abusers using its knowl- 
edge of standard fraud tactics and strategies. If deemed suspicious enough, 
that individual or organization would be reported for further investigation 
to the Department of Justice and investigators within HHS, and if proven 
guilty of fraud and abuse, would be promptly removed from the program. 
In that intermittent period of investigation, the individual or organization 
would be put on probation and their activity as a Medicare DME frozen 
until the investigation was complete. This would be a deterrent to others 
who are considering or have participated in fraud. 
Lastly, Congress should enact legislation that handles the issues 
with the pay and chase Medicare model. PPACA works diligently to re- 
duce fraud and prevent the Medicare system from losing money. But, as 
previous legislation has often done, PPACA deals more with specific types 
of fraud than the underlying reasons for the occurrence of fraud in the 
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Medicare system. The system allows fraud to occur at high rates because it 
places too much trust in the individual claimant and too little emphasis on 
claims review prior to reimbursement. The government needs take the ini- 
tiative to fix this broken scheme instead of continuing to make one-off 
fixes that do not address the overarching issue. 
This legislation should implement a system that requires greater 
oversight and Medicare protection. The legislation should deal with spe- 
cific types of fraud, propose remedies to deal with fraud that is currently 
occurring, and, most importantly, it should propose an overhaul of the pay 
and chase Medicare model. The legislation could encompass the first two 
recommendations and improve on the way the Medicare system is run. 
Legislation should identify and prioritize transactions that are at 
high risk for potential fraud or abuse, like power wheelchairs and prosthet- 
ics, and provide additional review before payment. CMS has data and pre- 
dictions of what items are fraught with fraud and abuse, so this should be a 
simple process of gathering information and identifying the most at-risk 
products. In addition, once identified, the product could be limited to only 
a number of Medicare-approved individuals and organizations. These in- 
dividuals would need to go through an extensive review process of their 
backgrounds and experiences with Medicare and Medicaid. Once deter- 
mined eligible to sell the high-risk products, the individual will be subject 
to periodic reviews in their facility. Since the products they are selling are 
prioritized, all claims will be subject to additional review. This plan will 
lower the potential for major fraud and limit the number of sellers, both 
making fraud more identifiable and disincentivizing fraud because the po- 
tential to get caught is much higher with a smaller group of sellers. 
While short-term costs are inevitable in order to implement and 
successfully run these changes, the long-term gains are invaluable. Fraud 
and abuse rates would greatly decrease by the increase in oversight and the 
creation of programs that restrict potential and current suppliers from eas- 
ily exploiting the system’s vulnerabilities. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Medicare fraud has been in the spotlight in recent years as PPACA 
overhauled the system and vowed to eliminate Medicare fraud. Specifi- 
cally, power wheelchair fraud has been one of the most profitable fraud 
industries in the last twenty years. The government has lost billions to in- 
dividuals who prey on the elderly and indigent in order to receive 
reimbursements from the Medicare system, made possible by the pay and 
chase Medicare model. While PPACA addressed power wheelchair   fraud 
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Medicare model. While PPACA addressed power wheelchair fraud spe- 
cifically and made successful changes to the system, PPACA fails to ad- 
dress the real flaw with Medicare reimbursement. History illustrates that 
legislation has only dealt with the parts of the issue, not with the underly- 
ing problem that has allowed for product after product to be manipulated 
by schemers who want to make quick money off the system. 
If the government wants to stop the massive amounts of fraud in 
the Medicare system, legislation must be enacted to change the pay and 
chase model to one that does not sustain and allow fraud so easily. A task 
force dedicated to reevaluating previously approved physicians, hospitals, 
and medical equipment companies would put these individuals and their 
histories with Medicare under scrutiny and would allow for further fraud 
protection. In addition, a standardized computer software program that de- 
tects fraudulent activities through pattern recognition and identifying red 
flag variables before fraud occurs would prevent further financial losses. 
Medicare is an important and essential part of the American 
healthcare system, but it is fraught with fraudulent claims and consistent 
abuse. Senator Bob Corker of the Special Committee on Aging sufficiently 
sums up the issue: "Just think about [it]. We have people within the bowels 
of government here, that know we have an eighty percent error rate, and 
[the fraud and abuse] just continues."74 A serious change must be made to 
the entire system to prevent the fraud from moving from power wheel- 
chairs to another product, as it has done in the past. It is in the hands of the 
government to make these changes and deal with the true problem –the 
Medicare reimbursement system is broken and must be fixed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74  Glor & Eisler, supra note 31. 
	  
	   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
